The benefits of international cooperation under climate uncertainty: a dynamic game analysis,

This paper investigates the benefits of international cooperation under uncertainty about global warming through a stochastic dynamic game. We analyze the benefits of cooperation both for the case of symmetric and asymmetric players. It is shown that the players’ combined expected payoffs decrease as climate uncertainty becomes larger, whether or not they cooperate. However, the benefits from cooperation increase with climate uncertainty. In other words, it is more important to cooperate when facing higher uncertainty. At the same time, more transfers will be needed to ensure stable cooperation among asymmetric players.

Subscribe to our newsletter

Last updated: 2021-06-24

IVL Swedish Environmental Research Institute

About IVL

IVL Swedish Environmental Research Institute has a wide environmental profile. We combine applied research and development with close collaboration between industry and the public sphere. Our consultancy is evidence-based, and our research is characterized by interdisciplinary science and system thinking.

Contact

Ikon med telefon

+46 (0)10-788 65 00

Social media

Ikon med LikedIn
Ikon med twitter
Ikon med facebook

© 2015 IVL Svenska Miljöinstitutet AB | About Cookies | How we process personal data

Ikon med kryss
To top